

SILK-TV

Secret Information Leakage from Keystroke Timing Videos

September 3rd, 2018 ESORICS 2018 - Barcelona

Kiran Balagani*, Mauro Conti[§], Paolo Gasti*, Martin Georgiev⁺, Tristan Gurtler*, Daniele Lain[§], Charissa Miller*, Kendall Molas*, Nikita Samarin⁺, Eugen Saraci[§], Gene Tsudik⁺, Lynn Wu*

* New York Institute of Technology
USA

§ University of Padua
Italy

+ University of California, Irvine
USA



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA


















Digram


t_{AB}



t_{AC}



Trigram







- Inter-keystroke times as a personal *signature*
- Used as biometric in authentication systems




























- Quantify information leakage of on-screen keystroke feedback
- Novel attack: *SILK-TV*
 - *Uses public datasets only from multiple sources (“population data”)*
 - *Machine Learning to guess typed text (passwords and PINs)*














- Passwords
 - Data from **projector** and **laptop screen** @ 60Hz
 - Recorded with a smartphone
 - 62 users - 3 times each pwd - *touch* typing on keyboard
 - `jillie02`, `william1`, `123brian`, `lamondre`
- PINs
 - Data from **screen** @ 60Hz
 - Recorded with a videocamera
 - 22 users for 3 sessions - 12 times each PIN - on a ATM numpad
 - 15 selected PINs




- Baseline: password list sorted by frequency
 - “Best” strategy for a zero-information attacker
 - 123brian - 93,874th
 - jillie02 - 1,753,571st
 - lamondre - 397,213rd
 - william1 - 187th ← *very frequent password*
- Evaluation scenarios
 - “Single shot”
 - “Multiple recordings” (e.g., professor at lectures)


Password - "Single Shot" results




(a) 123brian (183 auth. attempts).



(b) jillie02 (186 auth. attempts).




(c) lamondre (184 auth. attempts).




(d) william1 (183 auth. attempts).


Password - "Single Shot" results




(a) 123brian (183 auth. attempts).



(b) jillie02 (186 auth. attempts).




(c) lamondre (184 auth. attempts).




(d) william1 (183 auth. attempts).


Password - "Single Shot" results




(a) 123brian (183 auth. attempts).



(b) jillie02 (186 auth. attempts).



(c) lamondre (184 auth. attempts).



(d) william1 (183 auth. attempts).



Password - "Single Shot" results

	Avg	Stdev	Med	Rnd	<Rnd	Best	<20k	<100k
Random Forest								
123brian	581,743	414,761	508,332	93,874	8.7%	5,535	1.1%	9.3%
jillie02	749,718	448,319	656,754	1,753,571	97.8%	28,962	0.0%	2.7%
lamondre	301,906	334,681	199,344	397,213	75.0%	145	13.0%	33.7%
william1	246,437	264,090	145,966	187	0.5%	68	10.9%	39.9%
Neural Network								
123brian	923,534	165,454	886,802	93,874	0.0%	577,739	0.0%	0.0%
jillie02	456,811	210,512	383,230	1,753,571	100.0%	164,754	0.0%	0.0%
lamondre	517,472	189,355	493,713	397,213	28.8%	148,403	0.0%	0.0%
william1	265,813	140,753	215,840	187	0.0%	45,176	0.0%	3.8%



Password - "Single Shot" results



	Avg	Stdev	Med	Rnd	<Rnd	Best	<20k	<100k
Random Forest								
123brian	581,743	414,761	508,332	93,874	8.7%	5,535	1.1%	9.3%
jillie02	749,718	448,319	656,754	1,753,571	97.8%	28,962	0.0%	2.7%
lamondre	301,906	334,681	199,344	397,213	75.0%	145	13.0%	33.7%
william1	246,437	264,090	145,966	187	0.5%	68	10.9%	39.9%
Neural Network								
123brian	923,534	165,454	886,802	93,874	0.0%	577,739	0.0%	0.0%
jillie02	456,811	210,512	383,230	1,753,571	100.0%	164,754	0.0%	0.0%
lamondre	517,472	189,355	493,713	397,213	28.8%	148,403	0.0%	0.0%
william1	265,813	140,753	215,840	187	0.0%	45,176	0.0%	3.8%




Password - "Single Shot" results

	Avg	Stdev	Med	Rnd	<Rnd	Best	<20k	<100k
Random Forest								
123brian	581,743	414,761	508,332	93,874	8.7%	5,535	1.1%	9.3%
jillie02	749,718	448,319	656,754	1,753,571	97.8%	28,962	0.0%	2.7%
lamondre	301,906	334,681	199,344	397,213	75.0%	145	13.0%	33.7%
william1	246,437	264,090	145,966	187	0.5%	68	10.9%	39.9%
Neural Network								
123brian	923,534	165,454	886,802	93,874	0.0%	577,739	0.0%	0.0%
jillie02	456,811	210,512	383,230	1,753,571	100.0%	164,754	0.0%	0.0%
lamondre	517,472	189,355	493,713	397,213	28.8%	148,403	0.0%	0.0%
william1	265,813	140,753	215,840	187	0.0%	45,176	0.0%	3.8%

PIN - Results



PIN - Results





- Timing information from videos is **accurate**
- Password masking leak timing → useful information
 - Reduces number of attempts
 - More useful on **uncommon** passwords!
- PIN masking looks safe

SILK-TV

Secret Information Leakage from Keystroke Timing Videos

Daniele Lain

ETH Zurich

daniele.lain@inf.ethz.ch





Passwords - "Multiple Recordings"

	Avg	Stdev	Med	Rnd	<Rnd	Best	<20k	<100k
Random Forest								
123brian	552,574	468,539	402,166	93,874	14.1%	13,931	4.7%	14.1%
jillie02	713,895	410,225	606,403	1,753,571	100.0%	67,875	0.0%	1.6%
lamondre	398,186	425,811	236,905	397,213	65.6%	404	6.2%	25.0%
william1	370,933	602,654	148,405	187	1.6%	19	17.2%	42.2%
Neural Network								
123brian	922,655	129,927	889,406	93,874	0.0%	676,418	0.0%	0.0%
jillie02	439,414	155,385	402,332	1,753,571	100.0%	205,645	0.0%	0.0%
lamondre	503,248	137,276	504,493	397,213	21.3%	182,123	0.0%	0.0%
william1	248,769	103,240	216,630	187	0.0%	86,213	0.0%	1.6%

Video information extraction

